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1 Introduction
The international development community has been
put on notice. The Center for Global Development
asserts, ‘For decades development agencies have
disbursed billions of dollars … Yet the shocking fact is
that we have relatively little knowledge about the net
impact of most of these programs’ (Savedoff and
Levine 2006; CGD 2006). The criticism is accompanied
by a proposed minimum standard of knowledge: ‘To
determine what works.... It is necessary to collect data
to estimate what would have happened without the
program ... [only thus is it] ... possible to measure the
impact that can be attributed to the specific program’.
The criticism also contained a note of despair; and it
called for an independent evaluation entity to ensure
rigour in the evaluation of development programmes.
This article reconsiders the veracity of the assertion
of the ‘shocking fact’ for the Inter-American
Development Bank (IADB), a multilateral Bank that
lends to Latin American and Caribbean countries,
and whether the Bank’s independent evaluation
office, the Office of Evaluation and Oversight (OVE),
has made any difference. The article also contributes
to the discussion regarding these criticisms of the
international development community’s lack of
evaluative rigour. The article mainly documents the
experience of the OVE in carrying out impact
evaluations, the asserted minimum standard of
knowledge. 
The story’s relevance, however, is not limited to
other evaluation offices of multilateral and bilateral
organisations in the development community. The
challenge faced by OVE, namely the ex post
evaluations of projects that were not designed for
impact evaluation and didn’t collect outcome data, is
probably the most common challenge faced by
evaluators. In addition, OVE’s experience adds to the
growing evidence questioning the validity of the
arguments against impact evaluations. The litany of
arguments normally consists of: it is too difficult; it is
too expensive; too few governments will agree; and
there is no institutional mandate. Thus, the
challenges faced by and the experience of OVE
contribute to understanding the real-world
approaches to impact evaluations.
2 The context
The Office of Evaluation and Oversight (OVE) was
created in mid-1999 as part of the reform of the
Bank’s evaluation system. At that time OVE became
independent of bank management, reporting solely
to the Board of Executive Directors. In this redesign,
the Board mandated OVE to: conduct Country
Programme Evaluations (CPEs); conduct policy,
strategy, thematic, and instrument evaluations;
oversee the Bank’s internal monitoring and
evaluation system; oversee reviews of corporate
strategy; provide normative guidance on evaluation
issues; and contribute to evaluation capacity-building
in the region. 
OVE did not have a mandate to evaluate individual
operations. Only in 2003 did OVE receive a mandate
to perform ex post project evaluations (IADB 2003).
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Thus, rather than being put on notice, the reason
OVE took on this exercise was a change in Bank
policy. 
The new policy mandated ex post project evaluations
two to four years after a project closed. It said little to
nothing about selection of what or how to evaluate
or the minimum method standard that should be
adopted. However, there was an assumption of
standalone project evaluation and a method of
before-completion-after naïve reflexive type. The
Bank would do the before-completion part and OVE
would be relegated to the completion-after part.
However, the policy was based on false premises.
First, the Bank does not routinely collect the
necessary information on outcomes (neither baseline
values nor their values near the time of project
completion) for the before-completion naïve
reflexive evaluations.3 Generally, there is no full
statement of development outcome intent at project
approval. The Bank’s system does not typically collect
outcome information on ongoing projects. The
Bank’s evaluations are almost void of statements on
development outcomes upon closure (see Figure 1).
While it is necessary to collect data to estimate what
would have happened without the programme in
order to determine what works, the Bank’s
evaluation system is not designed to do so; it does
not typically even collect outcome information on
beneficiaries.4
Second, there is an assumption that outcomes can
only be discerned years after a project has closed.
However, other than lumpy investment loans, many, if
not most, of the Bank’s loans finance programmes in
which development effects can be discerned a few
years into the project. Third, the policy’s focus was on
the IADB projects. Often these are embedded in
larger country programmes. Thus, leaving aside the
contribution to the design of a programme, unless the
benefit and the selection process of beneficiaries
differ between the project and programme, then the
focus should be on the programme not the project
regarding development effectiveness. Finally, the policy
emphasised the ‘sustainability’ of the programme
more in fiscal and institutional terms rather than in
terms of the sustainability of the development effects.
Given this context, OVE decided to implement the ex
post evaluation task on the basis of three principles:
First, despite no institutional mandate, it decided to
set impact methodology as a minimum standard
(Blundell and Costa 2002). Second, to conduct the
impact evaluations using a theory-based approach
(Fear 2007). Third, to adopt a purposeful rather than a
random selection criterion of the programmes to be
evaluated, i.e. select similar projects within a thematic
or meta-evaluation. OVE accepted that to determine
‘what works and what does not’ requires a
quantitative approach, and within the quantitative
approach, accepted the emerging consensus of a
hierarchy of empirical evidence.5
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Figure 1 Information on outcomes of IADB operations
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The above principles were accompanied by decisions
on how to implement the evaluation. The first issue
was whether to carry out the evaluations in-house
or to outsource them. The decision was to
experiment with different modalities that covered all
possibilities. The second issue was how to select
consultants. The decision was to create a network of
evaluators. The third issue was how to involve those
evaluated, i.e. Bank staff and governments. The
decision was to create a peer review group drawn
from the Bank’s staff and another peer review group
within the country.
3 Experience
In this section, we narrate OVE’s experience in
carrying out impact evaluations. The success is judged
with respect to numerous benchmarks: rigorous
method standard, full implementation of the theory-
based approach, meta-evaluations, the cost of the
evaluations, the organisation of the task, and advocacy
of impact techniques as a minimum standard.
3.1 Rigorous method 
If the standard of success is the use of counterfactuals
to determine the impact of programmes, then OVE
has been successful. The Office has so far used the
following impact techniques. Of the 27 processed
evaluations (i.e. publicly available), the techniques used
have been, in order of importance: double difference
with propensity score method (11), single difference
with propensity score method (8), regression-
instrument variable (7), and discontinuity regression
method (1).6 Sometimes, for sensitivity or robustness
reasons, more than one method in a given evaluation
was used. Often, naïve (i.e. before-after comparison
of beneficiaries) or pipeline (i.e. comparison group
composed of applicants to a programme who have
not yet received the programme’s benefits)
techniques are included in OVE’s impact evaluations.
In fact, the signature feature of OVE’s ex post
programme evaluations is that they consist of routine
comparisons between naïve (before-after or pipeline)
and impact calculations. The reason for the
comparison is essentially to advocate to the Bank that
its task is not to fully implement its existing system
based on an ex post comparison with a baseline but
no comparison group, but rather to move towards a
system that routinely involves impact evaluations. In
Chart 2, the naïve and impact evaluations of a Social
Investment Fund in Panama are shown using the
change in poverty as the outcome. The naïve before-
after calculation shows that poverty rose amongst the
beneficiaries. The programme was a failure. The
impact calculation shows that the programme’s
impact is a reduction in poverty. The programme was
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Figure 2 Naïve vs. impact
Social Investment Fund – Panama z Profile: Social Investment Fund,
Panama; basic infrastructure to poor
communities
z Data: Distribution of benefits by
municipalities from administrative
data; baseline and results of
outcome indicators from
households surveys 1994–2001
z Technique: Treatment and
comparison group using PSM in
double difference. The sample
included 75 municipalities. Potential
to work with a sample of more
than 250 smaller geographic units
but household survey was not
representative at that level
z Results: Naïve evaluation: the
program failed. Impact evaluation:
the programme succeeded 
z Cost: US$22,944 
z Modality: in-house
Naive Impact
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successful. The example illustrates the ‘you do not
necessarily get what you see’ reason for impact
evaluations and the fact that impact calculations are
not always less than naïve ones.
A priori, OVE expected to frequently use the
regression discontinuity technique (Imbens and
Lemieux 2007). High expectations were based on
the assumptions that many programmes had budget
limits relative to the targeted population and the
programme’s beneficiary selection process was based
on ranking of applicants. However, de facto, OVE has
found it difficult to obtain the rankings and was
therefore unable to use this technique. Perhaps the
problem of non-availability is due to the continuing
confusion between audits and evaluations. The only
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Figure 3 Fuzzy discontinuity
-
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
-2
.0
-1
.6
-1
.2
-0
.8
-0
.4 0.
0
0.
4
0.
8
1.
2
1.
6
2.
0
2.
4
2.
8
3.
2
Granted
SDR
Source Benavente et al. (2007).
ranted
R
Relative ranking
Fr
ac
ti
on
 t
re
at
ed
Figure 4 Labour training and random treatment impact estimation
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z Profile: Labour Training programme, in
the Dominican Republic
z Data: Simple randomisation including
a follow-up survey done at 10–14
months after graduation from training.
786 treated and 563 controls. Baseline
has universe, follow-up was a
stratified random sample (size
determined by standard formulae)
z Technique: Estimated Average
Intention-to-treat on treated by
simple diff of means, verified with
weighted diff and regression analysis
(no difference in difference because of
a faulty baseline)
z Results: Employability, income and
health insurance access increased. 
z Cost: US$31,000
z Modality: joint (staff and external
consultantsSource Ibarraran and Rosas (2006).
z Profile: Science and Technology – Chile.
Financing for research projects
z Data: Administrative data of all applicants.
Ratings of all applicants and identification
of accepted and rejected applicants and
publications recorded in the ISI – SCI 
z Technique: Discontinuity regression design.
The selection process drawn by a
‘threshold’ quality value that separates
beneficiaries from non-beneficiaries
z Results: Unsuccessful. FONDECYT has no
significant positive impact on the scientific
production of the financed projects.
z Cost: US$25,000
z Modality: joint (staff and external consultants)
example is an evaluation of a Chilean Government
Research Fund. The outcomes used were number
and quality of publications. The impact calculations
reveal that the programme had no significant effect
on outcomes. Figure 3 shows that the method is
possible even when the accepted/non-accepted
classification of applications to a programme do not
strictly follow the published ranking criteria of the
programme. In this case the method is fuzzy
discontinuity. However, the argument that even fuzzy
data can be used does not reduce the fear that an
evaluator is really an auditor.
In contrast, OVE did not expect to be able to
estimate an impact effect based on experimental
data which, being a priori, is the ideal setting in
which to perform unbiased impact evaluations.7
However, in the labour training thematic review,
two random evaluations were feasible. One was the
result of a well thought-out evaluation design
(Dominican Republic) and the other was from a
natural experiment, in which a valid control group
was de facto created due to an administrative cluster
(Panama). Figure 4 shows the impact evaluation of
the labour training programme in the Dominican
Republic which used random assignment. It shows
that the programme was successful for employability,
income, and access to health insurance.
The above example also shows that impact
evaluations are often limited to establishing whether
there was a significant impact on the outcomes of
interest. This is also the most common approach of
OVE. However, policy concern also includes the
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Figure 5 Dosage and multi-treatment impacts of a regional transfer fund
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z Profile: National Fund for
Regional Development.
Decentralised investment to
finance infrastructure and
productive projects
z Data: Administrative data for
distribution of benefits by
municipalities. Baseline and results
of outcome indicators from
household surveys 1994–2001. The
sample included 343 municipalities
z Technique: Impact evaluation using
PSM in double difference. The
municipalities grouped by per
capita investment using cluster
analysis 
z Results: Positive and increasing
impact on poverty incidence
(reduction) on per capita
investment. No impact on poverty
if investment is intensive in
education. Greater impact on
welfare composite index in
municipalities with diversified
investment
z Cost: US$ 31,323
z Modality: joint (staff and external
consultants)
Source Ruprah and Marcano (2007).
issues of whether more budgetary outlay per capita
increases the benefit, the dosage dimension of a
programme, and whether a multi-treatment has a
greater impact than single treatment. Figure 5 shows
the impact calculations for Chile’s government
regional fund, the National Fund for Regional
Development (FNDR). The transfers are mostly
specific-purpose input-based conditional, non-
matching transfers. Figure 5 shows the different
impacts of increased per capita transfers; there is no
increase in poverty reduction above 12 times the
base expenditure. The impact of transfers increases
for diversified transfers (no one type of transfer is
greater than 20 per cent of total transfers) vs.
concentrated transfers (one type of transfer is 50 per
cent or higher, in this case, for education) where the
outcome is school attendance.
3.2 Theory-based
If the benchmark for success is the systematic testing
of all the links – the assumptions – in the causality
chain of a given programme, then OVE’s success has
been partial. This partial success is due to budget
restrictions and because it was often impossible to
retrofit the required information. 
A theory-based approach was adopted because it
often gives plausibility to the impact findings. Theory-
or programme-based approaches map out the
channels through which the activities, inputs, and
outputs are expected to result in the expected
outcomes. They also allow for the identification of
unintended effects. Such mapping helps to identify key
assumptions whose empirical validity could be tested
for, allows an integration of contextual analysis,
including process evaluation, that could account for
the same programme design performing differently,
and possibly allows for the distinction between
implementation failure and design failure. Not all these
possible advantages have been fully exploited by OVE. 
However, a distinction is often made between
process evaluations and outcome evaluations, where
impact evaluation is assumed to be only useful for
determining outcomes. On the contrary, the impact
technique can be used to evaluate process. For
example, community participation is often asserted
to have high dividends in terms of outcomes relative
to non-community participation programme delivery
systems. Often, satisfaction surveys are taken as
sufficient to determine the success of a programme.
Figure 6 shows the impacts of community
participation on the efficacy of a social investment
fund on school attendance and grade repetition as
well as community satisfaction. The evaluation shows
that if ‘dividend’ is taken to mean perceptions, i.e.
community satisfaction, then the assertion is correct.
If dividend is taken to mean an increase in outcomes,
then it is incorrect – the impacts are statistically zero.
Impact techniques can also be used to check for the
validity of key design features of a programme. In
Latin America many government social housing
programmes are based on the ABC (Spanish
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Figure 6 The impact of community participation
z Profile: Social Investment
Fund, Honduras
z Data: From special survey
carried out by the World Bank
plus administrative data
z Technique: Impact evaluation
using single difference
propensity score method 
z Results: No impact on
outcomes using participatory
method
z Cost: US$13,000 
z Modality: outsourced-0.20 
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acronym for savings-grant-mortgage) design. High
delinquency rates of publicly provided mortgages are
often interpreted to be an example of intrinsic moral
hazard of public provision. This is an interpretation
often supported by a probit regression with a
dummy for the provider. The moral hazard
interpretation leads to a call to change the provider
from public to private. However, by using propensity
score matching to obtain a valid comparison group
(i.e. borrowers with similar relevant characteristics)
and estimating the regression, the provider becomes
irrelevant. The problem is incapacity to pay, hence
redesign calls for the elimination of the mortgage
component and a corresponding increase in the
grant component. Figure 7 shows the marginal
impact of mortgages provided by the public entity
versus a private one. The marginal effect of public
provision is a statistically significant increase in the
probability of delinquency. As the right-hand side of
Figure 7 shows, the regression is based on very
dissimilar households. Using the matched data, for
the support group composed of similar households
that received either a private or a public mortgage,
the marginal effect of the provider becomes
statistically zero.
3.3 Meta-evaluations 
If the standard of success is the systematic evaluation
of similar programmes across time and space then
OVE has been relatively successful. The thematic
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Figure 7 Mortgage delinquency rates: moral hazard or incapacity to pay
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approach, i.e. simultaneously evaluating similar
programmes, was adopted on the assumption that
using a similar methodology, similar control variables,
and a common set of outcomes would lend greater
credibility to the evaluative findings of a given type of
a programme.
The first round of meta-evaluations included: youth
labour training programmes; science and technology;
and rural roads. The second round, which is in the
advanced production stage, includes projects
investigating agricultural technology uptake, social
investment funds, and early childhood development
programmes. A third round, in early production
stage, includes citizen security, animal and plant
health systems, and housing programmes.8
An example of a thematic evaluation is given in Table
1. A literature review of the impacts of active labour
market programmes in general and job training
programmes in particular, finds modest results in
OECD countries. There are very few evaluations of
these programmes in Latin America. OVE analysed
the experiences, applied the most robust
methodology for each country, and then repeated
the analysis with the same estimation technique in
all the countries. The analysis concluded that there
are significant impacts for particular groups, such as
women and in some cases the youngest participants.
In general, the impacts are larger for the quality of
employment (i.e. formality) than for the gross
employment rate.
However, what theory rarely illuminates is the
dynamic path of the benefits of a given intervention.
The best that can be obtained is an unambiguous
statement of steady state effects. Thus the timing of
an impact evaluation may matter. Figure 8 shows the
impacts on income and consumption of the Rural
Road Rehabilitation programme in Peru. It not only
shows a different impact from motorised as opposed
to non-motorised rural road rehabilitation, but also
shows differing changes of those effects over time.
For example, in terms of sustainability of benefits,
the evaluation of the job training programme in the
Dominican Republic illustrates the importance of
continuous follow-up. Figure 9 shows the impact of
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Table 1 Summaries of individual labour training evaluations
Methodology & data Employment rate Formality Wages
Argentina quasi-experimental, 10–30% for youngest 0–3%, 6–9% for young not significant
four rounds, primary (<21) males
data
Dominican experimental, one none, health insurance 9% 17% (sign. at 10%), 
Republic round, primary data higher (5–6%) but not higher for men larger for males 
significant in the East & (43% vs. 34%) under 19
Santo Domingo
Mexico quasi-experimental, no clear pattern for 10–20% for salaried no consistent patterns,
six rounds, primary general employment workers, 0–20% for at best small and 
data self-employed, mostly not 
higher since 2002 significant
Panama natural experiment, 0–5%, overall not significant, overall negligible, 
one round, primary 10–12% for women probably higher outside large for women 
data and in Panama Panama City (38%) and in 
Panama 25%
Peru quasi-experimental, 13% (much higher 11% (14% women, not significant
five rounds, primary for women – 20% 5% men)
data than for men – 
negligible)
Source Ibarraran and Rosas (2006).
labour training on a given cohort over time. The
short-term results (ten months after training)
suggested limited impacts; however after more time
had elapsed, positive impacts were detected – albeit
declining after a certain point. 
3.4 Costs
If the benchmark of success is judged by obtaining
impact evaluations ‘on the cheap’ then OVE has
been very successful. The high costs of impact
evaluations are often invoked to explain the lack of
impact evaluations. The World Bank reports a cost of
US$300,000–500,000 per project, adding to the
fear of adopting an impact standard for evaluation
(White 2006). The costs of OVE evaluations (staff
time, travel costs, and consultants) are much lower,
averaging about US$43,000.9
The lower financial costs follow from, first, selection
bias, i.e. selecting themes or projects where there is
a high a priori probability of finding existing data.
OVE keeps costs down by not generally incurring
primary data collection. Second, costs are reduced
due to economies of scale obtained by evaluating a
number of similar interventions simultaneously. Third,
costs are less due to exploiting local expertise by
using local consultants through a specially created
network of evaluators, EVALNET. Local consultants
have a priori knowledge of context, actors,
programme etc., which bypasses upfront learning
costs and they usually charge less than similar
evaluators from developed countries as there are
reduced travel and interview costs. Most importantly,
the network can be used to determine where the
required data is available. 
However, there are quality costs to this approach.
The method adopted in the evaluations was due to
the data available for the evaluation – not the other
way round.10 Using existing secondary data has all the
problems of the ‘tail wagging the dog’. First, it
implies an extremely high dropout rate of about 65
per cent. Second, not all desirable outcomes,
intended or unintended, can be measured. Third, it is
not always possible to determine the impact of a
common set of outcomes using a common set of
control variables and the same estimation technique
across similar projects, which is the objective of a
meta-evaluation. This reduces comparability across
evaluations. Fourth, it implies cutting corners – not
necessarily by accepting a lower level of statistical
precision, but by not being able to determine
impacts at a lower level of disaggregation, i.e.
differentiating impacts by the different groups in the
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Figure 8 Rural roads and sustainability of benefits
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z Profile: Rural Roads in Peru
Construction and upgrade of
roads in rural areas
z Data: Specific survey of
beneficiaries. Baseline
collected after programme
started. Follow-up survey 3
years after programme closed.
z Technique: Double difference,
PSM
z Results: Positive impact on
income and per capita
consumption of rural
households. Decreasing impact
on income with time
Decreasing/increasing impact
for motorised/non-motorised
roads
z Cost: US$94,467
z Modality: joint (staff and
external consultants)SourceWassenich (2006).
 apita income per year
 apita consumption per year
population being studied, and by not being able to
evaluate all components of a given project.
3.5 Organisation
If the benchmark of success is judged by the
determination of an ideal organisational structure
that underlies the impact evaluation, then OVE has
been unsuccessful. The first organisational dimension
examined was which modality (in-house, outsourced,
or in-between) was better. Of the 27 processed
evaluations, 63 per cent were completely outsourced
and 26 per cent were completely in-house.
However, of the evaluations in progress most are
mixed with the impact exercise being in-house but
the context and programme description outsourced.
The second organisational dimension was selection
of consultants. The creation of a network of
evaluators has been extremely useful. About 535
evaluators are fully registered, of whom 70 per cent
are Spanish speakers. The network has been very
useful in searching both for in-country experts and
for the existence of the necessary data for an impact
evaluation.11 The third dimension was mechanisms to
involve the evaluated. The peer modality adopted by
the Office has been unsuccessful both generally at
obtaining input at the evaluation proposal stage, and
at systematically entering into the Bank’s cycle of
design-evaluation-redesign of programme. The few
examples of success are due to idiosyncratic reasons,
i.e. individuals despite institutional resistance.
3.6 Advocacy
If the standard of success is the achievement of a
systemic mainstreaming of impact evaluation within
IADB, where impact evaluations are used routinely in
the design and redesign of operations, then OVE has
been unsuccessful.
This failure cannot be due to costs. The IADB
approves annually about US$6.5 billion, it annually
disburses about US$5 billion, its annual research
budget is US$36 million, of the existing portfolio of
loans there are US$65 million nominally allocated (as
part of a loan or in an associated technical grant) to
evaluation. It cannot be due to staff without the
required skills. Given the competitive salaries it pays,
it could easily hire the expertise. It cannot be due to
the lack of an institutional mandate. The absence of
a mandate is self-imposed. 
Failure can perhaps be attributed to two reasons. On
an individual professional level it could be argued that it
pays to be ignorant (Pritchett 2002). Publicly available
impact findings are of interest to neither the IADB’s
operations officers responsible for the loan, nor for the
staff of the programme’s executive agency that
represents the government which contracted the loan.
A finding of a zero impact plus a high present value of
the debt incurred would be politically inconvenient for
both parties.12 At the institutional level, there are clearly
trade-offs between the different uses of evaluation: 
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Figure 9 Labour training and sustainability of benefits
Source Internal OVE follow-up of the project whose evaluation was summarised in Figure 4.
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z Profile: Youth Training
Programme in Dominican
Republic
z Data: specific survey of
participants and a randomly
selected comparison group
z Technique: Simple difference
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random design)
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They are simultaneously used as an instrument of
transparency and control, accountability,
legitimization and institutional learning. With
respect to the legitimization function, evaluation
can be thought of as a marketing device to prove
the aid organization’s successful work to the
general public … However … the legitimization
function seems to be dominating. Transparency
and legitimization are clearly conflicting objectives
in all cases in which actual development
outcomes are not fully satisfactory. 
(Michaelowa and Borrmann 2005) 
An external evaluation office would by its very nature
be viewed as one whose role is accountability, and
would by institutional design be outside the design-
implementation-experience-redesign learning cycle.
The failure is also due to OVE. There cannot be
advocacy if there is no effective dissemination policy.
Dissemination through documents, seminars,
conferences etc. have been crowded out in order to
meet the increasing targets for the number of
projects evaluated. 
4 Conclusions
The asserted ‘shocking fact’ of ignorance of development
effects is correct for IADB. It is not correct if OVE is
taken into consideration. OVE’s experience suggests that
‘You can get it if you really want.’
OVE’s experience shows that the arguments that
impact evaluations are too difficult, too expensive,
too few governments will support them, and too far
from feasibility without an institutional mandate do
not hold. They are not too difficult; like everything
they just require the appropriate skills. They are not
too expensive. They are not opposed by most
governments, once it is understood that they do not
involve budget costs. They can be carried out
independently of an institutional mandate.
Thus, if the benchmark of success is the production of
a large number of rigorous evaluations then OVE’s
story is one of exceptional success. This benchmark is
inappropriate, however. Success should be measured
by the degree to which impact evaluations are
adopted as the norm in the institution. This has not
occurred. The demonstration effect is non-existent.
Success could also be judged by the creation of an
effective virtuous cycle of institutional learning,
whereby independent evaluation leads to the
identification and utilisation of lessons by the
institution, leading to improved operational work that
in turn leads to improvement in lives. This has not
entirely materialised. The few examples of success are
due to idiosyncratic factors not institutional ones.
Thus OVE’s experience bodes ill for the proposed
independent international evaluation entity. The
challenge is not the feasibility of impact evaluations
at the retail level; OVE’s experience reveals this is
entirely feasible. The real challenge is to succeed in
convincing actors in the international development
community to measure the impact of their
programmes and in doing so to obtain the scale
needed for an effective virtuous cycle of improving
lives through evaluation. After four years, OVE has
been unable to convince its own institution of the
virtues of impact evaluation.
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Source IADB. (The IADB maintains a database of photographs of most of its projects.)
Figure 10 Photographs of before/completion of a slum upgrading project in Favela Barrios, Brazil
Notes
1 The title of a reggae song by Jimmy Cliff.
2 Of the Office of Evaluation and Oversight of the
IADB, I would like to thank for their input
particularly Luis Marcano and Pablo Ibarraran and
also Allesandro Maffioli, Yuri Soares and Ana
Santiago, all members of OVE who are involved
in ex post impact evaluations.
3 For a summary of the first year’s experience of
OVE and an evaluation of the Bank’s monitoring
and Evaluation system see OVE’s report: Ex post
Project Evaluation: 2004 Annual Report, AE-112,
August 2005.
4 A couple of disheartening examples that OVE has
came across are the following. In one case data
collected by the Bank that could have been used for
an impact evaluation were thrown out. The reason
offered by Bank staff was that the data were
contaminated as they contained identifiable
beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries of the
programme! Another example is OVE staff were
welcomed by an executive agency of a Bank
programme; they were happy that someone had
come to collect the boxes that were using valuable
space. The boxes contained sequential surveys still in
paper form for evaluating a watershed project. Years
of water and rats, however, precluded their use. 
5 This brief summary of the ‘principles’ papers over
a heated discussion of methodology within OVE.
Within OVE the discussion ranged from taking
photographs of before and on completion to that
only random trials were acceptable. Many of the
points discussed paralleled the issues raised in the
review of the debate on methodology standards
by Coryn (2007). 
6 All of OVE’s evaluations are made public. In the
case of individual programme’s ex post reports,
perhaps to the Office’s under-investment in
dissemination, there is an increasing stock of
unprocessed (reviewed, formatted, and put on the
web) reports.
7 For this argument see Dufflo and Kramer (2005).
For an agnostic view, see Davidson (2007).
8 Standalone programme evaluations were
previously studied for two of these themes. See
for the housing case Ruprah and Marcano (2007)
and, for the citizen security case I.J. Ruprah and
Luis Marcano, ‘Safer Chile: an Impact Evaluation
of Chile’s Citizen Security Program’ (2007) not
processed. However, the idea that first a
standalone evaluation should be undertaken, and
then the experience drawn from this should be
applied to other similar programmes has not been
typical.
9 Note that the total cost of the ex post project
evaluation exercise is higher than the sum of the
costs of the individual programme evaluations.
There is a high attrition rate i.e. most of the
projects selected for the meta-evaluations are
abandoned as no data for an impact can be found.
10 Of the 27 processed evaluations 74 per cent used
existing surveys and only 18 per cent used surveys
commissioned by OVE.
11 This has required detailed terms of reference that
are sent out through EVALNET in which the
terms of reference ask for an evaluation with
options, i.e. the price of: (i) existing data; or
(ii) new data; or (iii) a combination of both.
‘Processed’ means the evaluation document is
reviewed, formatted and put on the web
simultaneously with a paper version produced.
‘Unprocessed’ means such a process has not been
completed. All of OVE's evaluations are made
public. The Office produces two types of
individual project evaluations reports; Working
Papers and Ex Post Project Evaluation Reports.
The latter contains, in addition to the impact
results, details of the IADB project (i.e. process
evaluation). In the case of individual programme's
ex post reports and working papers, perhaps due
to the Office's under-investment in dissemination,
there is an increasing stock of unprocessed
reports
12 Any impact design and evaluation by the Bank is
due to idiosyncratic factors such as professional
interest of the operational officer or government.
However, these are not part of the routine
evaluation system.
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